Initial commit

.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1778788519483_yvr565_result.log

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+[2026-05-14T19:55:57.058Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "The security-review skill requires a git repository, which isn't initialized here. I'll proceed with a direct security analysis of the provided files.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vulnerabilities\": [\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"src/canvas/types.ts\",\n      \"line\": 19,\n      \"description\": \"AppCard 'command' field accepts arbitrary string with no validation. If passed to shell execution (exec, spawn, etc.), this enables command injection attacks. Example: command: 'rm -rf /; ls' could execute destructive commands.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"src/canvas/types.ts\",\n      \"line\": 14,\n      \"description\": \"NoteCard 'text' field has no sanitization markers. If rendered as HTML or used in innerHTML without escaping, enables XSS attacks. Recommend storing as plain text and escaping on render.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"vite.config.ts\",\n      \"line\": 5,\n      \"description\": \"HMR host configuration uses environment variable directly without validation. While low-risk in dev, ensure TAURI_DEV_HOST is controlled and never user-supplied in production builds.\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"riskScore\": 68,\n  \"recommendations\": [\n    \"Implement command validation for AppCard.command — whitelist allowed commands or use a safe command builder (e.g., Tauri's command.execute API with args array instead of shell strings)\",\n    \"Sanitize/escape NoteCard.text before any HTML rendering — use React's built-in escaping or DOMPurify for dynamic content\",\n    \"Restrict terminal access (TerminalCard) — ensure PTY spawning validates the ptyId and user has permission to that terminal session\",\n    \"Add Content-Security-Policy headers in Tauri's tauri.conf.json to prevent inline script injection\",\n    \"Use Tauri's security features: enable allowlist, disable dangerous commands (shell, exec) in production, use scope permissions\",\n    \"No hardcoded secrets detected — verify this pattern is maintained (scan .env files, config files, comments)\",\n    \"All npm dependencies appear current — run 'npm audit' regularly and enable Dependabot\",\n    \"Validate all user input at app boundaries (canvas state, card creation, command execution)\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**Summary:** The codebase is minimal and relatively low-risk, but the `AppCard.command` field and `NoteCard.text` field present high-severity vulnerabilities if mishandled in implementation. The risk score reflects these two critical issues plus medium-risk environment configuration. Focus remediation on command injection prevention and output escaping.\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "vulnerabilities": [
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "src/canvas/types.ts",
+        "line": 19,
+        "description": "AppCard 'command' field accepts arbitrary string with no validation. If passed to shell execution (exec, spawn, etc.), this enables command injection attacks. Example: command: 'rm -rf /; ls' could execute destructive commands."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "src/canvas/types.ts",
+        "line": 14,
+        "description": "NoteCard 'text' field has no sanitization markers. If rendered as HTML or used in innerHTML without escaping, enables XSS attacks. Recommend storing as plain text and escaping on render."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "vite.config.ts",
+        "line": 5,
+        "description": "HMR host configuration uses environment variable directly without validation. While low-risk in dev, ensure TAURI_DEV_HOST is controlled and never user-supplied in production builds."
+      }
+    ],
+    "riskScore": 68,
+    "recommendations": [
+      "Implement command validation for AppCard.command — whitelist allowed commands or use a safe command builder (e.g., Tauri's command.execute API with args array instead of shell strings)",
+      "Sanitize/escape NoteCard.text before any HTML rendering — use React's built-in escaping or DOMPurify for dynamic content",
+      "Restrict terminal access (TerminalCard) — ensure PTY spawning validates the ptyId and user has permission to that terminal session",
+      "Add Content-Security-Policy headers in Tauri's tauri.conf.json to prevent inline script injection",
+      "Use Tauri's security features: enable allowlist, disable dangerous commands (shell, exec) in production, use scope permissions",
+      "No hardcoded secrets detected — verify this pattern is maintained (scan .env files, config files, comments)",
+      "All npm dependencies appear current — run 'npm audit' regularly and enable Dependabot",
+      "Validate all user input at app boundaries (canvas state, card creation, command execution)"
+    ]
+  },
+  "durationMs": 37575,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-14T19:55:57.058Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1778788519483_yvr565"
+}